SOUTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY
MAJOR BOOK REVIEW/S

The Difference of Man and the Difference It Makes. By Mortimer  J. Adler.
New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1967. 294 pages. $7.95.

Mortimer ]. Adler, who is director of the Institute for Philosophical Re-
search in Chicago, raises anew the old issues of evolution, but he does it in a serious and thorough way. Adler evaluates the question of man’s nature in the thought context of evolution. Does man fit into the continuity of life that evolutionary thought sketches? Or, is man basically different from other creatures below him? If there is a difference in man, what kind of difference is it and how can it be defended? Adler poses the possible alternatives in man’s difference. It may be (1) a difference in degree, (2) a superficial difference in kind-which is reducible to the first type-and (3) a radical difference in kind (pp. 27-28).

In searching for answers to the questions Adler surveys the philosophical
answers through the centuries, the contributions from genetics, paleontology, psychology, neurology, anthropology, and computer science. Among scientists the general conclusion is that “. . . there is unanimous agreement that man and man alone uses verbal symbols and has a propositional language and syntactically structured speech” (p. 112).

lf this be true, the next question is: can this aspect of man’s uniqueness
be explained in terms of the neural system and the brain, or is the brain the
“sufficient condition of the happenings that are described as sensations, feelings, images, memories, perceptions, and as conceptions, judgments, and inferences" (pp. 204-205 ) ?

Adler agrees with the little known argument of Aristotle for an immaterial
Principle--or that man is radically different from other creatures-in man’s
makeup. The bare argument is summed in two propositions; first, “concepts whereby we understand what different kinds or classes of things are like consist in meanings or intentions that are universal” (p. 220). Second, “nothing that exists physically is actually universal; anything that is embodied in matter exists as an individual, and as such it can be a particular instance of this class or that” (p. 221).

The conclusion drawn from the two propositions is that “our concepts
must be immaterial, If they were acts of a bodily organ such as the brain,
they would exist in matter, and so would be individual. But they were
universal. Hence they do not and cannot exist in matter, and the power of
conceptual thought by which we form and use concepts must be an immaterial power, i.e., one the acts of which are not the acts of a bodily organ” (p. 221).

After this conclusion is reached, the question is raised w hether a robot
or machine will be built in the future that will do everything that man can
do by way of speech and thought. If this could be done one might conclude that the immaterialist position is false.

The last part of the book deals with the difference it makes. If man is
not radically different in kind from the creatures below, the practical con-
sequences are enormous. The reasoning by which we justify killing creatures below us and condemn killing of man is set aside. “What is wrong in principle with the Nazi policies toward the Jews and the Slavs” if there are differences only in degree (p. 264)? What is wrong in principle with the strong killing the weak, and the mental elite enslaving the dumb? Past reasons are set aside if man is not radically different. Actions are no longer related to right and wrong, but to pure expediency (p. 267).

The radical difference of man--opposed to a superficial difference in kind
--is related to religious thought: man's image of God, special creation for the human race, and free will and moral responsibility. If the future proves the radical difference of man to be wrong, chaos will erupt in religious and moral thought. But if the attempt to produce a man-like-machine fails persistently in the future, “. . . the portion of the learned world that would be most shocked by an altered view of man . . . would be all those who are united in common) disbelief--disbelief in the dogmas of traditional orthodox Christianity" p. 294 .

This work is serious, fair, and raises a vital issue in philosophy and theology. We would wish it a wide reading. 

Dallas  M. Roark